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CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE IN COMMERCIAL LANDLORD 
BANKRUPTCIES: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT MADE THE 
RIGHT DECISION IN MATTER OF SPANISH PEAKS 
HOLDINGS II, LLC 
ABSTRACT 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Matter of Spanish Peaks Holdings II, 
LLC exposes a major loophole in the Bankruptcy Code in the landlord-tenant 
context. To exploit this loophole, real estate developers can establish two entities 
and have them enter into a lease as landlord and tenant, with the lease’s terms 
heavily favoring the tenant. Then, should the landlord have to file for bankruptcy 
relief and liquidate its encumbered property, most lower courts will let the 
tenant retain possession for the duration of the lease. In this way, the developer 
will receive a financial windfall in the form of either a buyout or the opportunity 
to continue running the tenant’s business on the purchaser’s land. This windfall 
will come at the expense of the landlord’s creditors, since encumbered land sells 
for less at auction. The majority approach therefore fails to balance the 
Bankruptcy Code’s competing goals of maximizing creditor recovery and 
protecting tenants. 
To prevent such an abuse of the bankruptcy system, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a rule that requires tenants to request adequate protection prior to the 
bankruptcy auction to receive continued possession or compensation. Because 
the tenants in Spanish Peaks failed to make such a request, the Ninth Circuit 
held that it was appropriate to terminate their leases without compensation. The 
court left open the more difficult question of what it would have done had the 
tenants requested adequate protection. This Comment explores that remaining 
issue. It first argues that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented opinion aimed at 
depriving two tenant entities of continued possession or compensation. It next 
proposes a way for judges to fashion adequate protection so as to minimize the 
impact of an undeserving tenant’s recovery on the landlord-debtor’s legitimate 
creditors. Since the Ninth Circuit’s holding allows judges to minimize tenant 
recovery and thereby deter developers from exploiting the loophole in the 
Bankruptcy Code, this Comment concludes that the minority approach of 
fashioning adequate protection is more pragmatic than the majority approach 
of always granting continued possession. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Matter of Spanish Peaks Holdings II, 
LLC (“Spanish Peaks”) has deepened an already great divide among the courts 
regarding what to do with a commercial tenant’s leasehold interest when a 
landlord sells its encumbered land at bankruptcy auction.1 Applying § 365 of 
title 11 of the U.S. Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), most courts hold that any 
tenants automatically get to remain in possession until the lease expires.2 
Spanish Peaks departed from this majority approach because the sophisticated 
landlords involved devised a savvy way to abuse it.3 Specifically, under the 
majority approach, an individual can establish two entities and have both entities 
enter into a lease as the landlord and tenant with terms that heavily favor the 
tenant entity. Then, should the landlord entity’s business fail, forcing it to seek 
bankruptcy relief and liquidate its property, courts will permit the tenant entity 
to continue encumbering the land for the duration of the lease. The fact that the 
land comes with a bad bargain will presumably lower its value at auction, raising 
less money for the landlord’s creditors.4 Worse, to obtain full, unencumbered 
fee simple in the land, the purchaser will have no choice but to buyout any 
tenants. A tenant with a heavily one-sided, long-term lease could presumably 
demand (and receive) a high price. The individual whose landlord entity had just 
filed for bankruptcy relief would receive a huge windfall from such a buyout, 
since it would allow that person to recoup losses at the expense of any creditors. 
Therefore, there is a tremendous financial incentive for people to arrange real 
estate developments in a way that allows some recovery in case of bankruptcy 
liquidation. 
 
 1 Pinnacle Rest. at Big Sky, LLC v. CH SP Acquisitions, LLC (In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC), 
872 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 2 See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (labelling this approach “the 
‘majority’ approach”). Title 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) provides:  
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor and—
if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such lease 
(including rights such as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent and other 
amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, 
assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the 
term of such lease and for any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights 
are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
 3 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 4 Id. at 898.  
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To avoid landlord recovery under this scenario, the Ninth Circuit adopted an 
approach that deprived commercial tenants of automatic continued possession.5 
Courts that follow the Ninth Circuit’s “minority approach” to landlord 
bankruptcies hold that, under 11 U.S.C. § 363, trustees can sell property free and 
clear of a tenant entity’s lease, provided that on request of the tenant, the 
bankruptcy judge grants it “adequate protection” for its interest.6 In Spanish 
Peaks, the tenants failed to request adequate protection; therefore, the circuit 
court authorized a sale of the encumbered land free and clear of their leasehold 
interests.7 The Ninth Circuit left open the more difficult question of what it 
would have done had the tenant entities sought to protect their rights prior to the 
bankruptcy auction.8 Accordingly, no one knows exactly what adequate 
protection will look like under § 363(e).9 Only the Southern District of New 
York, in Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC (“Dishi & Sons”), has discussed the 
adequate protection problem in this context. In Dishi & Sons, the court stated in 
dicta that continued possession would have been the appropriate form of 
adequate protection under the circumstances.10 However, the Ninth Circuit in 
Spanish Peaks suggested that there could—and should—be other forms of 
adequate protection, although it did not say what those other forms might be.11 
Still, letting the tenants recover anything would not only be contrary to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s goal of maximizing creditor recovery,12 but it would also 
leave open the loophole that the landlord in Spanish Peaks attempted to 
exploit.13 
Many judges will soon have to face this adequate protection problem in the 
commercial landlord-tenant context, considering that the minority approach 
posited by Spanish Peaks, which requires tenants to timely request adequate 
 
 5 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 6 See, e.g., Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech 
Steel Holdings Corp.), 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 
at 899 (labelling this approach “the ‘minority’ approach”). Title 11 U.S.C. § 363 provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that has 
an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, 
the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is 
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.  
 7 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896. 
 8 Id. at 900. 
 9 See Jerald I. Ancel et al., Can A § 363 Sale Dispossess A Tenant Notwithstanding § 365(h)?, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., July/August 2003, at 18, 31. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899. 
 10 Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 11 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 892. 
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protection, appears to be trending.14 Indeed, in Spanish Peaks the Ninth Circuit 
became the second of two federal circuit courts of appeals to adopt it.15 Thus, 
not only does the minority view now bind at least twelve states and the Western 
District of Pennsylvania,16 but the weight of two circuit court opinions suggests 
that judges in other parts of the country will begin adopting it as well.17 
Therefore, in future landlord bankruptcies, well-informed tenants will likely ask 
for adequate protection as a precautionary measure,18 which means that many 
judges will soon be forced to provide “adequate protection” for tenants under 
§ 363(e). 
This Comment explores the open issue of what a bankruptcy judge should 
have done had the tenants diligently requested adequate protection in Spanish 
Peaks. It proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by providing an overview of the 
two approaches to landlord bankruptcies, and then gives the facts of Spanish 
Peaks. Next, Part II argues that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented opinion 
aimed at depriving the undeserving tenant entities of adequate protection. Given 
the outcome-oriented nature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, this Comment 
explores how a bankruptcy judge could have avoided granting compensation or 
continued possession to the tenants, even if they had requested adequate 
protection. Finally, Part III asserts that the minority approach is more practical 
than the majority approach because it offers judges more flexibility in dealing 
with the leases of commercial tenants; it is therefore less vulnerable to 
exploitation by sophisticated landlords. This Comment is limited to landlord 
 
 14 See id.; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307 
B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004) (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech). 
 15 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel 
Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech). 
 16 Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin in the Seventh Circuit; Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington in the Ninth Circuit. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 
F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821 
at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech). 
 17 See Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and the Sad History 
of § 365 (h) of the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97, 127 (2004) (stating that “there is a good 
possibility that [the law of the Seventh Circuit] will be followed by other courts”). See also In re Hill, 307 B.R. 
at 825 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s minority approach).  
 18 See Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 700, for a case in which the tenant of a bankrupt landlord requested 
adequate protection as precautionary measure. See also Gary F. Torrell, Owner vs. Tenant Rights in a Property 
in Bankruptcy, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2018, at 12, 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here 
is to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code 
Section 363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); 
Alan R. Lepene, Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., & Louis F. Solimine, Ninth Circuit Reignites Debate over Interplay of 
Sections 363, 365, L. J. NEWSL. (Oct. 2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/ 
2017/10/01/ninth-circuit-reignites-debate-over-the-interplay-of-sections-363-365/?slreturn=20180201205408.  
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bankruptcies in the commercial context and is agnostic with regard to residential 
leases. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Two Approaches to Landlord Bankruptcies 
1. The Majority Approach 
Courts are split on what to do with a commercial tenant’s leasehold interest 
when a trustee or debtor-in-possession sells encumbered property in a 
bankruptcy sale.19 While the only two circuit courts that have considered the 
issue required tenants to request adequate protection prior to the auction to 
receive the protections of the Bankruptcy Code,20 most bankruptcy courts and 
district courts hold that tenants do not need to do anything to remain in 
possession for the duration of the lease.21 For instance, the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of South Carolina in In re Taylor granted the tenant continued 
possession until the lease’s expiration.22 In Taylor, the landlord-debtor leased 
out his five nursing homes to five related entities, collectively called the 
“Magnolia Entities.”23 After filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor made a 
motion to sell the five nursing home facilities free and clear of the Magnolia 
Entities’ leasehold interests pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1) and (f).24 The 
Magnolia Entities objected, and the bankruptcy court faced the issue of whether 
§ 363 authorizes a sale of land free and clear of a lessee’s interest.25  
Like most lower courts that have considered this issue, the bankruptcy court 
denied the landlord-debtor’s request under § 363 to sell the encumbered 
properties free and clear of the tenants’ leases.26 Instead, the court held that 
§ 365(h) trumps § 363 and thus entitles a tenant in a landlord bankruptcy to elect 
 
 19 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898. 
 20 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel 
Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537. 
 21 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, 
LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”). 
 22 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 142. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing 
In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).  
 23 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 144. 
 24 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 152. 
 25 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 153. 
 26 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 168. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing 
In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”). 
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either continued possession or a cause of action for breach of contract.27 In 
reaching its conclusion, the court applied two lines of reasoning. First, the court 
invoked the canon generalia specialibus non derogant, or a specific provision 
prevails over a conflicting general provision.28 Under this interpretive principle, 
the court determined that § 365(h), which “specifically references the situation 
where the debtor is the lessor and with great particularity sets forth the rights 
and duties of the lessor and lessee,” should prevail over the less specific § 363.29 
Second, the court looked to the legislative history regarding § 365.30 There, the 
court found “a clear intent on the part of Congress to protect a tenant’s estate 
when the landlord files bankruptcy.”31 To let a debtor or trustee sell the 
encumbered land free and clear of any leasehold interests would, according to 
the court, “be in direct contravention of the lessee protections specifically 
afforded by § 365,” even if the lessee received compensation for its interest from 
the proceeds of the auction.32 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the 
debtor’s motion to sell the encumbered land free and clear of the tenant’s lease.33  
2. The Minority Approach: Qualitech 
While most lower courts follow the holding in Taylor, which entitles tenants 
of bankrupt landlords to remain in possession,34 the Seventh Circuit adopted a 
different view in 2003.35 Specifically, in a case of first impression at the circuit 
level, the Seventh Circuit held in Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel 
SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp.) 
(“Qualitech”) that prior to a bankruptcy auction, a commercial lessee must 
request adequate protection from the bankruptcy judge to prevent the liquidation 
of the encumbered property free and clear of the leasehold interest.36 Qualitech 
featured a land lease that the Qualitech Steel Corporation and Qualitech Steel 
 
 27 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 at 168. 
 28 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 165. The canon generalia specialibus non derogant provides that a specific 
provision prevails over a general provision. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012). Section 
365(h)(1)(A) applies to situations in which “the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which 
the debtor is the lessor.” It states that “if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights 
under such lease . . . for the balance of the term of such lease.” Section 363(f), on the other hand, applies more 
broadly to situations in which the trustee “sell[s] property . . . free and clear of any interest in such property.”  
 29 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 165 (emphasis in original). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 165–66. 
 33 Id. at 168. 
 34 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (labelling this approach “the ‘majority’ 
approach”). 
 35 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. 
 36 Id. at 540, 548. 
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Holdings Corporation (collectively “Qualitech”) entered into with Precision 
Industries, Inc. and Circo Leasing Co., LLC (collectively “Precision”) on 
February 25, 1999.37 Under the agreement, Qualitech leased land at its Indiana 
steel mill facility to Precision for a term of ten years.38 Precision intended to 
construct and operate a warehouse on the space to provide on-site supply 
services for Qualitech.39 Precision paid nominal rent of $1 per year, and enjoyed 
exclusive possession of the warehouse for the term of the lease.40 In exchange, 
the lease granted Qualitech the right at the expiration of the term to purchase the 
warehouse, its fixtures, and other improvements for $1.41 In reliance on the lease, 
Precision built and stocked a warehouse on the steel facility, and Qualitech 
began purchasing goods from Precision.42  
On March 22, 1999—fewer than four weeks after execution of the lease—
Qualitech filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.43 About three months later, on June 
30, 1999, Qualitech sold virtually all of its assets, including the encumbered 
land, at auction for $180,000,000 to a group of pre-petition lenders that held the 
primary mortgage on the Indiana facility.44 By this time, there were more than 
$380,000,000 in claims against Qualitech’s estate.45 Qualitech owed more than 
$263,000,000 of this amount to the pre-petition lenders that purchased the 
property at auction.46 On August 13, 1999, the bankruptcy court entered an order 
approving the sale and directing Qualitech to convey its assets “free and clear of 
all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests” to the purchasers.47 Shortly 
thereafter, on August 26, 1999, the purchasers transferred their interest in the 
assets to Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (“New Qualitech”).48 Fatal to its case, 
Precision neither objected to the sale nor requested adequate protection.49  
After receiving the land, New Qualitech changed the locks on the warehouse 
Precision constructed.50 This move led to a dispute between Precision and New 
Qualitech over whether Precision still had a leasehold interest in the property 
 
 37 Id. at 540. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 540 n.1. 
 46 Id. at 540 n.2. 
 47 Id. at 540–41. 
 48 Id. at 541. 
 49 Id. at 548. 
 50 Id. at 541. 
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following the bankruptcy auction.51 The parties took their dispute to the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which resolved the matter 
in New Qualitech’s favor under the “unequivocal” language of the sale order.52 
Precision appealed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana reversed, applying the majority approach of always granting 
continued possession.53 New Qualitech then appealed the district court decision 
to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that § 363 extinguished Precision’s possessory 
interest in the property.54 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the rule that in a landlord bankruptcy, a 
commercial tenant must request adequate protection prior to the liquidation of 
the encumbered land to avoid losing its leasehold interest.55 Although the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the South Carolina Bankruptcy Court’s decision 
in Taylor,56 it reached the opposite conclusion and held that § 365(h) does not 
supersede § 363(f).57 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the land sale occurred 
free and clear of Precision’s lease since Precision failed to timely request 
adequate protection.58 The Seventh Circuit gave two main reasons for its 
conclusion.59 First, it applied the canon that judges should interpret sections of 
the Code so as to avoid conflicts between them.60 The Seventh Circuit thereby 
read §§ 363(f) and 365(h) in such a way that they could coexist.61 Because the 
court observed that §§ 363(f) and 365(h) lack limiting cross-references found in 
other provisions of §§ 363 and 365, it stated under the maxim of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius that Congress seemingly did not intend for § 365(h) to limit 
§ 363(f).62 Further, the plain language of § 365(h)(1) restricts it to cases in which 
the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) “rejects” a lease, saying nothing about sales 
of estate property.63 The court took the view that Congress therefore left the 
 
 51 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 541. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 542. 
 54 Id. at 542–43. 
 55 Id. at 548. 
 56 Id. at 545, 546, 547. 
 57 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 546-47. 
 58 Id. at 548. 
 59 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537. 
 60 Id. at 548. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 547 (citing City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)). The canon expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius “instructs that, where a statute designates a form of conduct, the manner of its 
performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions 
were intentional exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed.) (2017). 
 63 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537 at 547 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(h)(1)(A)). 
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governance of bankruptcy sales to § 363.64 Second, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that § 363 contains its own mechanism of protecting tenants: the adequate 
protection provision of § 363(e).65 “Adequate protection,” according to the 
court, “does not necessarily guarantee a lessee’s continued possession of the 
property, but it does demand, in the alternative, that the lessee be compensated 
for the value of its leasehold—typically from the proceeds of the sale.”66 Hence, 
the Seventh Circuit arrived at the general rule that:  
Where estate property under lease is to be sold, section 363 permits 
the sale to occur free and clear of a lessee’s possessory interest—
provided that the lessee (upon request) is granted adequate protection 
for its interest. Where the property is not sold, and the debtor remains 
in possession thereof but chooses to reject the lease, section 365(h) 
comes into play and the lessee retains the right to possess the 
property.67 
The Seventh Circuit defended its rule by pointing out that this interpretation 
honors the Bankruptcy Code’s “twin purposes of maximizing creditor recovery 
and rehabilitating the debtor.”68 The court concluded that because Precision 
failed to object to the sale or seek adequate protection under § 363(e) prior to 
the auction, the trustee properly sold the land free and clear of Precision’s 
leasehold interest.69  
B. The Reception of Qualitech 
Critics and lower courts alike have criticized the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
because it yields harsh results, unresolved issues, and potential negative 
consequences; relies on questionable statutory construction; and conflicts with 
legislative history.70 Thus, for nearly fifteen years, Qualitech had little influence 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 547–48. 
 66 Id. at 548 (internal citations omitted). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); Daniel J. Ferretti, Note, Eviction 
Without Rejection–The Tenant’s Bankruptcy Dilemma: Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(a) and 
the Divergent Interpretations of Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC and In re Haskell, 39 CUMB. 
L. REV. 707, 723-28 (2009); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why the 
Seventh Circuit Erred in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel, 59 BUS. L. REV. 475 (2004); Zinman, supra 
note 17, at 106-18; Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Rejection via Sale of Real Estate: Is Your Leasehold 
Interest Protected?, 26 ABI J. 7, 28 (2007); Christopher C. Genovese, Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel: 
Easing the Tension Between Sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 627 
(2004). But see In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).  
BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:09 AM 
200 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
on lower court holdings outside of the Seventh Circuit.71 For instance, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in In re Haskill concluded 
that “[i]f it were to [adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning], the provisions of 
§ 365(h) would be eviscerated.”72 In Haskill, the landlord-debtor entered into a 
ninety-nine year lease with the tenant-hospital with no fixed rent, and granted 
the tenant a second mortgage in the land.73 The landlord-debtor subsequently 
filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.74 In its proposed 
repayment plan, the debtor sought to liquidate the encumbered property free and 
clear of the tenant’s unexpired lease.75 As of the commencement of the case, the 
fair market value of the land at issue was approximately $6,500,000, and the 
amount of the first mortgage on the property was approximately $13,000,000.76  
The landlord-debtor argued that because the government in an eminent 
domain taking could hypothetically compel a lessee to accept a money 
satisfaction of its leasehold interest, a trustee could sell the encumbered property 
free and clear of the lease under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5).77 Citing Qualitech, the 
debtor further asserted that § 365(h) did not apply, because a court could read 
that section to coexist with § 363(f).78 Finally, the debtor insisted that the 
tenant’s lien on the property constituted adequate protection of its interest, even 
though the debtor’s attorney conceded that the tenant would likely receive no 
proceeds from a sale of the land.79 
Despite the fact that the Seventh Circuit had recently ruled otherwise,80 the 
Massachusetts bankruptcy court held that § 365(f)(5) automatically entitles 
tenants of bankrupt landlords to continued possession upon liquidation of the 
encumbered property.81 First, the court looked at the legislative history of 
§ 365(h), which showed that Congress intended to protect tenants’ estates in 
landlord bankruptcies.82 The bankruptcy court reasoned that allowing a trustee 
 
 71 See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1. But see In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning 
set forth in Qualitech). 
 72 In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 9. 
 73 Id. at 3–4. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 3. 
 76 Id. at 5. 
 77 Id. Section 363(f)(5) provides that “[t]he trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest in 
such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . such entity could be compelled . . . to accept a money 
satisfaction of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
 78 In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).  
 79 In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5. 
 80 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548. 
 81 In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 8–10. 
 82 Id. at 7 (citing In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 165-66 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996)). 
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to sell land free and clear of any leasehold interests—as the Seventh Circuit had 
done—would dispossess a tenant and would therefore be contrary to the purpose 
of § 365(h).83 Second, the court feared that letting the debtor dispossess the 
tenant would nullify § 365(h).84 Finally, the lower court noted that if it were to 
grant adequate protection under § 363 by replacing the tenant’s leasehold 
interest with a lien on the property, the tenant would be unlikely to recover any 
proceeds from the bankruptcy sale.85 The court found this outcome 
unacceptable, and ultimately granted the lessee continued possession.86 In 
arriving at its conclusion, the bankruptcy court in Haskill explicitly rejected the 
statutory interpretation and outcome of Qualitech87 and instead adopted the 
majority view of always granting continued possession.88  
Michael St. Patrick Baxter took the position that the Seventh Circuit wrongly 
decided Qualitech on both textual and pragmatic grounds.89 Baxter first wrote 
that the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in its view that § 365(h) does not limit 
§ 363(f).90 To support this claim, Baxter observed that “the legislative history of 
§ 365(h) reveals that Congress has consistently sought to strengthen lessee rights 
when [those rights] were threatened by narrow court interpretations.”91 Further, 
for purposes of §§ 363(f) and 365(h), a sale that effects the repudiation of a lease 
is not different from a sale that rejects a lease.92 The Seventh Circuit’s 
conclusion to the contrary effectively nullified § 365(h).93 Additionally, Baxter 
argued that the Seventh Circuit erred in reasoning that adequate protection under 
§ 363(e) could be an acceptable alternative to continued possession under 
§ 365(h).94 He elaborated that “[t]o convert a lessee’s § 365(h) rights to cash 
compensation in the form of adequate protection under § 363(e), as suggested 
by the Seventh Circuit, would be tantamount to an impermissible cramdown of 
the lessee.”95 Finally, Baxter questioned how a court could place a value on a 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 9–10. 
 86 Id. at 10. 
 87 Id. at 9.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Baxter, supra note 70, at 476 (Baxter is a partner with Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, D.C., 
and an adjunct professor of law at George Washington University School of Law.). 
 90 Id. at 482 (citing In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp. 327 F.3d at 547). 
 91 Baxter, supra note 70, at 484 (citing Robert M. Zinman, Landlord’s Lease Rejection and the 1984 
Amendments to § 365(h), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 31 (1994)). 
 92 Id. at 486. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 491. 
 95 Id. 
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lost leasehold interest, given that no precedent exists.96 These textual issues with 
the Qualitech holding led Baxter to conclude that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly 
decided the case.97 
Baxter also feared that the Qualitech decision would create a number of 
practical problems.98 In particular, Baxter worried that the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning would lead debtors to attempt “stealth rejections of leases” to avoid 
the requirements of § 365(h).99 Such rejections “may be devastating to lessees 
and real estate lease financiers who rely on the ability of lessees to retain 
possession of their leasehold interests in the event of the bankruptcy of the 
lessor.”100 At the same time, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion would be an 
advantage to the debtor because the debtor would be able to cramdown on the 
lessee.101 Hence, Baxter discouraged all courts from following the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Qualitech.102 
Professor Robert Zinman specifically responded to Baxter’s arguments.103 
While Zinman agreed with Baxter that Qualitech discouraged leasehold 
financing and conflicted with the congressional intent of § 365 to protect tenants 
in landlord bankruptcies, he pointed out that the Seventh Circuit was correct in 
its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.104 Professor Zinman therefore 
concluded that the Seventh Circuit actually reached the right outcome.105 
Because a bankrupt landlord in a minority-approach jurisdiction could 
essentially ignore § 365(h) and sell encumbered land free and clear of leasehold 
interests, Zinman feared that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Qualitech would 
“completely disrupt leasehold investments.”106 These effects conflicted with 
Congress’s intent “to protect the tenant’s estate and the rights of those with 
interests in that estate when the lease is disaffirmed in the landlord’s 
 
 96 Baxter, supra note 70, at 491. 
 97 Id. at 477. 
 98 Id. at 495–99. 
 99 Id. at 496. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 497. 
 102 Id. at 500. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, Baxter also mentioned that Qualitech “may 
have substantial implications for the licensing of intellectual property.” Id. at 475. Specifically, Baxter feared 
that Qualitech might “be applied . . . in § 363(f) sales to extinguish the rights of licensees of intellectual property 
under § 365(n).” Id. at 477. 
 103 Zinman, supra note 17 (Robert Zinman is a professor at St. John’s University School of Law.). 
 104 Id. at 99-101, 127. See also In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).  
 105 Zinman, supra note 17, at 127. Baxter reached this conclusion based on the language of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  
 106 Id. at 99–100. 
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bankruptcy.”107 Congress did not intend “that the landlord could easily avoid 
these protections by employing § 363 in lieu of § 365.”108 Nevertheless, based 
on the text of the Bankruptcy Code, the Seventh Circuit held that a landlord 
could do just that.109 
Even though Zinman believed that the Qualitech decision conflicted with 
congressional intent, he found that the Seventh Circuit did not err in its textual 
analysis of the interplay between §§ 365(h) and 363.110 Indeed, the canon that 
generalia specialibus non derogant—the canon on which the majority of lower 
courts relied—only applies when two provisions deal with the same situation 
and produce different results.111 Sections 363 and 365 deal with distinct 
circumstances.112 As such, Zinman agreed with the Seventh Circuit that § 365 
should not trump § 363.113 To support his conclusion, Zinman pointed out that 
“[§§ 363 and 365] are clear and make no reference to each other,” while other 
Bankruptcy Code sections contain careful references to any other conflicting 
provisions.114 The rule that expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests that 
Congress purposefully omitted limiting cross-references, and thus intended that 
§§ 363 and 365 would not conflict.115  
Zinman went on to expressly refute Baxter’s argument that the Seventh 
Circuit had misinterpreted the text of the Bankruptcy Code.116 Whereas Baxter 
found § 363(l) to evidence Congress’s intent to subordinate all of § 363 to 
§ 365,117 Zinman claimed that § 363(l) only applies to limited circumstances, 
and thus only conflicts with certain clauses of § 365.118 Additionally, “to put the 
‘subject to’ language in the provision designed to deal with ipso facto clauses in 
 
 107 Id. at 118. 
 108 Id. 
 109 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537. 
 110 Zinman, supra note 17, at 100, 127. 
 111 Id. at 124. The canon generalia specialibus non derogant provides that a specific provision prevails 
over a general provision. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 568 U.S. at 21. 
 112 Zinman, supra note 17, at 124. According to Zinman, “[u]nder § 365, the landlord retains ownership 
of the property, while under [§] 363, the landlord disposes of the fee interest either subject to, or free and clear 
of the lease.”  
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 125. As an example, Zinman examined the cross-references contained in § 363(d).  
 115 Id. The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius “instructs that, where a statute designates a form of 
conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers, courts should 
infer that all omissions were intentional exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th 
ed.) (2017). 
 116 Zinman, supra note 17, at 125–27. 
 117 Baxter, supra note 70, at 484; Zinman, supra note 17, at 125-26. 
 118 Zinman, supra note 17, at 125-27. 
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an attempt to subordinate all of § 363 to § 365,” as Baxter argued Congress had 
done, “would simply constitute illogical drafting.”119 Even though Zinman 
disagreed with Baxter that the Seventh Circuit had errantly interpreted §§ 363 
and 365, he questioned whether the Qualitech result was correct in practice and 
reflective of the spirit of § 365 to protect tenants.120 Accordingly, Zinman called 
on Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to offer greater tenant protection in 
landlord bankruptcies.121 
Scholars and attorneys have also criticized Qualitech for its negative real-
world implications and its unresolved issues.122 For example, one critic argued 
that Qualitech was contrary to Congress’s intent to protect lessees in landlord 
bankruptcies, since the Seventh Circuit allowed a debtor-in-possession to 
effectively dispossess a tenant that had already greatly invested in the 
property.123 Likewise, another critic noted that the protections afforded tenants 
under § 363 are inferior to those of § 365, and as such developer tenants may be 
reluctant to take the risk of developing or improving leased property.124 Finally, 
one lawyer simply noted that Qualitech failed to define precisely what adequate 
protection would look like.125  
C. Adequate Protection under Dishi & Sons  
To date, only the Southern District of New York in Dishi & Sons has 
considered adequate protection in the landlord bankruptcy context, which the 
court stated in dicta that it would have provided to the tenant in the form of 
continued possession.126 While Dishi & Sons offers some guidance, the Ninth 
Circuit’s discussion in Spanish Peaks suggests that other forms of adequate 
protection exist.127 Dishi & Sons involved a lease between the landlord, a 
majority owner of two commercial condominium units, and the tenant of one of 
those units, a pub called The Ginger Man (“TGM”).128 The landlord owed a 
 
 119 Id. at 127. 
 120 Id. at 100, 167 ; Baxter, supra note 70, at 484. 
 121 Zinman, supra note 17, at 100, 167. 
 122 See Ferretti, supra note 70, at 726-27; Genovese, supra note 70, at 643, 646-47; Ancel et 
al., supra note 9, at 31. 
 123 Ferretti, supra note 70, at 726-27. 
 124 Genovese, supra note 70, at 646-47. 
 125 In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537. See also Genovese, supra 
note 70, at 641; Ancel et al., supra note 9, at 31. 
 126 Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. 696. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (citing 
only Dishi & Sons as authority on the issue of fashioning adequate protection for a tenant in the landlord 
bankruptcy context). 
 127 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899. 
 128 Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 699. 
BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:09 AM 
2019] COMMERCIAL LANDLORD BANKRUPTCIES 205 
creditor approximately $13,500,000 on these condominium units, with the 
creditor securing its interest with a mortgage on the property.129 After the 
landlord-debtor filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, it filed a chapter 11 plan proposing to sell the condominium unit free and 
clear of TGM’s lease.130 Dishi & Sons (“Dishi”) then purchased the property—
purportedly free and clear of TGM’s interest—at a bankruptcy auction with a 
bid of $6,075,000.131 Before the bankruptcy court confirmed the landlord’s 
chapter 11 plan and approved the sale, TGM requested continued possession for 
the duration of the lease under § 365(h) or, alternatively, adequate protection 
under § 363(e).132  
The district court adopted the majority position and determined that § 365 
entitled TGM to continued possession until the lease’s expiration.133 However, 
the court took a belt-and-suspenders approach and also addressed—in dicta—
Dishi’s argument that the bankruptcy court had erred in granting TGM continued 
possession under § 363(e).134 Dishi asserted that adequate protection should 
have instead taken the form of a sum of money or possession for a limited term, 
since these solutions would be more fair to the purchaser.135 The court rejected 
Dishi’s arguments, first noting that “§ 363(e) is focused upon protecting the 
entity whose interest is threatened, not other creditors or the purchaser.”136 The 
court then gave the rule that “[w]here it is improbable that the lessee will receive 
any compensation for its interest from proceeds of the sale, and it is difficult to 
value the lessee’s unique property interest . . . ‘adequate protection can be 
achieved only through continued possession of the leased premises.’”137 
Because the landlord-debtor owed significantly more on the property than what 
the property was worth, TGM probably would not have received any 
compensation from the bankruptcy sale.138 Additionally, the district judge found 
TGM’s leasehold interest difficult to value.139 Hence, the court concluded that 
had it been forced to provide adequate protection to TGM, continued possession 
would have been the proper solution.140  
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 700. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 708. 
 134 Id. at 711. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 711-12 (quoting In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 10). 
 138 Id. at 712. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 712. 
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D. Spanish Peaks: Facts and Holding 
In July 2017, the Ninth Circuit became only the second circuit court to deal 
with a tenant’s leasehold interest in the bankruptcy liquidation of a landlord’s 
encumbered property.141 To avoid inequitable results in the case of Spanish 
Peaks, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Qualitech, 
despite that decision’s unpopularity.142 Had the appellate court in Spanish Peaks 
adopted the majority approach of always allowing lessees to remain in 
possession for the duration of the lease, the founders of a bankrupt business 
would have recovered millions of dollars at the expense of their creditors.143 The 
Seventh Circuit’s minority approach of requiring tenants to request adequate 
protection to prevent a sale free and clear of encumbrances enabled the Ninth 
Circuit to close the loophole—at least this one time.144 Indeed, near the end of 
the opinion, the judges hinted that they did not know how they would have 
stopped the founders from exploiting the bankruptcy process by recovering 
millions of dollars at the expense of creditors had those founders diligently 
requested adequate protection.145 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit’s result-oriented 
approach prevented unjust results in Spanish Peaks, it remains unclear how 
judges will achieve similar outcomes in the future.146 
Spanish Peaks involved Spanish Peaks Holdings, LLC (“SPH”), the owner 
of a 5,700-acre Montana ski resort; and two of its tenants.147 The resort was “the 
brainchild of James J. Dolan, Jr., and Timothy L. Blixseth,” who obtained 
financing for the project by obtaining a $130,000,000 loan secured by a 
mortgage and assignment of rents.148 Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC 
(“SPAP”), ultimately ended up with the note and mortgage.149 The resort 
featured a number of specialized entities that owned and managed its 
amenities.150 These entities included The Pinnacle Restaurant at Big Sky, LLC 
(“Pinnacle”); and Montana Opticom, LLC (“Montana Opticom”), a 
 
 141 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 142 Id. See also Vicki R. Harding, Sale Free and Clear of Lease: The Battle Between Section 363 and 365, 
BANKRUPTCY-REALESTATE-INSIGHTS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bankruptcy-realestate-insights.com/2018/01/31/ 
sale-free-and-clear-of-lease-the-battle-between-section-363-and-section-365/ (“In [Spanish Peaks] it is likely 
that the [tenant entities’] blatant attempt to favor insiders made it more appealing to find in favor of the buyer.”). 
 143 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
 144 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 894. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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telecommunications company.151 Both entities had leasehold interests in SPH’s 
land.152 Specifically, in 2006 Pinnacle entered into a ninety-nine-year lease with 
SPH, agreeing to pay rent of $1,000 per year in exchange for restaurant space.153 
Three years later, in 2009, SPH entered into a lease with Montana Opticom for 
a term of sixty years, with an annual rent of $1,285.154 Dolan served as an officer 
of both SPH and Pinnacle, and was the sole member of Montana Opticom.155 In 
these capacities, he signed the Pinnacle lease as both the lessor and the lessee, 
and the Montana Opticom lease as the lessee.156 Notably, the mortgage securing 
SPH’s $130,000,000 loan was senior to these two leases.157 It is also important 
that neither tenant had a Subordination, Non-disturbance, and Attornment 
(“SNDA”) agreement with the mortgagee or with the landlord.158  
The Pinnacle lease provided that “[a]ll improvements constructed on the 
Premises by [the lessee, Spanish Peaks Development, LLC] shall be owned by 
[the lessee]” and that “any permanent improvements described in [the Pinnacle 
lease] shall become and remain [the lessor’s (Spanish Peaks Holdings, LLC’s)] 
property.”159 Despite any improvements that the lessees may have made to the 
restaurant space, in April 2011, Dolan and the Pinnacle Restaurant at Big Sky, 
LLC closed the doors to the Pinnacle Restaurant.160 As of March 10, 2014—the 
day on which the bankruptcy court issued its order—they still had not reopened 
them.161 The Montana Opticom lease provided for Montana Opticom to place 
telecommunication towers around the resort so that members of the Spanish 
Peaks club could have access to telephone and related services.162 Presumably, 
Montana Opticom did just that. 
 
 151 Id. at 894–95.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 894. The lease was actually between SPH and Spanish Peaks Development, LLC, but in 2008 
Spanish Peaks Development, LLC, assigned its interest to Pinnacle Restaurant. Moreover, as originally drafted, 
the lease provided that Spanish Peaks Development would pay SPH $1,000 per month through November 30, 
2007, and beginning December 1, 2007, the monthly payments would increase by a specified percentage. In re 
Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, No. 12-60041-7, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11 (Bankr. D. Mont. Mar. 10, 
2014) (subsequent history omitted). Spanish Peaks Developments and SPH terminated that lease on December 
14, 2007 and replaced it with the ninety-nine-year lease with annual rent of $1,000. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings 
II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11. 
 154 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 895. 
 155 Id. at 894. 
 156 Id. at 894-95 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11. 
 157 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896. 
 158 Ninth Circuit Allows Lease Stripping in Bankruptcy, Practical Law Legal Update w-009-3321 (West) 
(hereinafter “Practical Legal Update”). 
 159 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *9. 
 160 Id. at *12. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at *11. 
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When SPH filed a petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy on October 14, 2011, it 
still owed SPAP $122,000,000 on the $130,000,000 loan.163 After the 
commencement of SPH’s bankruptcy case, SPAP assigned its interest to CH SP 
Acquisitions, LLC (“CH SP”).164 On June 3, 2013, the trustee sold SPH’s land 
at auction to CH SP for $26,100,000.165 Ten days later, on June 13, 2013, the 
bankruptcy court entered an order approving the sale.166 This order provided that 
the trustee had sold the land free and clear of any leases.167 After a hearing on 
the issue of whether the order preserved the leasehold rights of Pinnacle and 
Montana Opticom, the bankruptcy court held that it did not.168 In reaching its 
conclusion, the bankruptcy court noted that neither Pinnacle nor Montana 
Opticom had requested adequate protection for their leasehold interests before 
the bankruptcy auction.169 The bankruptcy judge further found that: “Pinnacle 
had not operated a restaurant on the property since 2011,” “Pinnacle’s rent was 
far below the property’s fair market rental value of $40,000 to $100,000 per 
year,”170 and “the leases were executed ‘at a time when all parties involved were 
controlled by James J. Dolan.’”171  
The District Court for the District of Montana affirmed,172 and Pinnacle and 
Montana Opticom appealed.173 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit became the second 
(of two) circuit courts to take the minority view when it held that “the Pinnacle 
and [Montana] Opticom leases [had not] survived the sale of the property to 
CH SP.”174 The court reached this result by incorporating by reference the 
Seventh Circuit’s “sound textual analysis” of the interplay between §§ 363 and 
365 in Qualitech.175 The Ninth Circuit added to this reasoning two observations 
to support its position that § 363 should govern.176 First, the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out that § 363(f) authorizes a free-and-clear sale if applicable 
 
 163 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 895.  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 896. 
 167 Id. There were certain exceptions to the free-and-clear sale, but none of them apply here.  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Under the lease, Pinnacle agreed to pay rent of $1,000 per month for a term of ninety-nine years. Id. at 
894. 
 171 Id. at 896. 
 172 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, No. BR 12-60041, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77921, at *4 (D. 
Mont. 2015). 
 173 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 174 Id. at 896. 
 175 Id. at 899. 
 176 Id. 
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nonbankruptcy law permits such a sale.177 Under Montana law, “a foreclosure 
sale to satisfy a mortgage terminates a subsequent lease on the mortgaged 
property.”178 Given that CH SP held a mortgage on the property securing the 
debt owed to it of $122,000,000, the court noted that but for SPH’s bankruptcy 
filing, CH SP would have foreclosed on the property and thereby terminated all 
encumbrances.179 Second, the court added that while § 365 does reflect a 
congressional intent to protect tenants in landlord bankruptcies, the Code also 
seeks to “maximiz[e] creditor recovery.”180 The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
only the minority approach balances these “competing purposes in the way 
Congress intended.”181 Because Pinnacle and Montana Opticom had failed to 
request adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the bankruptcy and district courts had properly authorized a sale of the 
resort free and clear of the Pinnacle and Montana Opticom leases.182 
Although the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion quite easily under the 
Seventh Circuit’s bright-line requirements for requesting adequate protection, in 
dicta it confessed that it did not know what it would have done had the tenants 
diligently sought to protect their rights.183 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit remarked 
that “[s]ince Pinnacle and [Montana] Opticom did not ask for adequate 
protection until after the sale had taken place . . . the question of what protection 
the bankruptcy court could have or should have awarded is not before us.”184 
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the district court in Dishi & Sons 
would have fashioned adequate protection in the form of continued 
possession,185 the words “could have” here suggest that the Ninth Circuit 
envisioned other forms of adequate protection.186 As for what those additional 
forms might be, the court did not say.187 However, the words “should have” hint 
that the Ninth Circuit found adequate protection in the form of continued 
possession inappropriate under the facts.188 The court’s decision to adopt the 
Seventh Circuit’s heavily criticized minority approach of requiring tenants to 
 
 177 Id. at 899–900. 
 178 Id. at 900 (citing Ruby Valley Nat’l Bank v. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co., 317 P.3d 174, 178 (Mont. 
2014); Williard v. Campbell, 11 P.2d 782, 787 (Mont. 1932)).  
 179 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900. 
 180 Id. at 901 (quoting In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 181 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 901. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 900. 
 184 Id. 
 185 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (citing Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 711-12). 
 186 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
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request adequate protection suggests that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented 
opinion.189 The minority approach, despite its unpopularity, provided the court 
with a way to prevent debtor-affiliated entities from exploiting one-sided leases 
to the detriment of the creditors.190  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Spanish Peaks: A Result-Oriented Opinion 
The reason why the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s unpopular 
approach of requiring tenants to request adequate protection to receive 
compensation or continued possession lies in the case’s facts.191 Specifically, 
had the court taken the more prevalent view among the lower courts that tenants 
are always entitled to continued possession, two undeserving individuals would 
have gotten a tremendous financial windfall at the expense of their resort’s 
legitimate creditors. Worse, future land developers would have begun exploiting 
the same loophole, encouraging further inequity.  
The earliest hint of a result-oriented outcome came in the opening sentence 
of the opinion when the Ninth Circuit mentioned Timothy Blixseth as one of the 
visionaries behind the Spanish Peaks project.192 Blixseth, an ex-billionaire real 
estate mogul, ended up in solitary confinement in a Montana jail for fourteen 
months for civil contempt of court for disobeying an order of a United States 
district judge to not sell a separate resort in Mexico.193 Now out of jail, Blixseth 
is still in financial trouble for his development of the Yellowstone Club, an elite 
ski resort neighboring the Spanish Peaks resort.194 Blixseth’s creditors for the 
Yellowstone Club are pursuing him for approximately $250,000,000.195 They 
claim he borrowed $375,000,000 for the Yellowstone Club development and 
 
 189 Id. at 899. 
 190 Id. at 894. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
 191 See Harding, supra note 142. 
 192 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894. Nowhere else in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion or 
in the Bankruptcy Court’s order does Blixseth’s name appear. 
 193 Rick Anderson, Billionaire Who Went Bust Is Out of Jail and Still Owes Millions. Many Are Watching 
His Next Move, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-bankrupt-billionaire-
20160715-snap-story.html; Phil Drake, What Will Tim Blixseth Do With His Freedom?, GREAT FALLS TRIB., 
(July 7, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/2016/07/07/exclusive-blixseth-
hopes-end-near-legal-saga/86825334/.  
 194 Phil Drake, From Billionaire to Inmate, Yellowstone Club Founder Remains Defiant, GREAT FALLS 
TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/from-billionaire-to-inmate-
yellowstone-club-founder-remains-defiant/article_8c4e399e-7aeb-5850-a7af-7467c32393e9.html. 
 195 Id. 
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then pocketed much of the loan.196 The creditors are having significant issues: 
Blixseth’s millions have gone missing.197 As Blixseth said about the money, “I 
think that [a lot of it is offshore], but I don’t know where it is.”198 Even though 
the Ninth Circuit judges ordered Blixseth’s release from jail,199 the fact that he 
was a visionary behind the Spanish Peaks ski resort may have made the judges 
suspicious from the start about the tenants’ worthiness of continued possession 
or compensation. 
The values that the Ninth Circuit mentioned in the case add further evidence 
that the judges were looking to deprive the tenants of continued possession in 
Spanish Peaks.200 The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that Pinnacle’s $1,000 
annual rent was up to $99,000 less than the fair market annual rental value of the 
leased parcel of land.201 To grant continued possession for approximately ninety-
two years—the remaining period on the lease at the time of the 2013 bankruptcy 
sale—would have therefore deprived the purchaser of an opportunity to earn up 
to $92,000,000 in rent.202 Ignoring any possible deductions or exemptions, it 
would also deny the Government the opportunity to tax up to $92,000,000 of 
income as opposed to a meager $92,000.203 Moreover, given that the fair market 
rental value of the leased restaurant space was estimated at up to $100,000 per 
year, the lessee could presumably sell the right to use and enjoy the space for 
ninety-two years for a large sum of money. Recalling that Dolan controlled both 
the restaurant and SPH at the time the lease was executed,204 he presumably 
would have been the one to profit on a sale of Pinnacle’s remaining interest in 
the resort property.205 The fact that Dolan fought so hard for continued 
possession for a boarded-up restaurant suggests that he was seeking a buyout 
from the purchaser in an amount exceeding his legal fees incurred in taking the 
dispute all the way to the Ninth Circuit.206 Indeed, pursuant to the restaurant 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 Daniel Fisher, Former Billionaire Tim Blixseth Jailed Over Missing Funds, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2014, 
10:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/12/18/former-billionaire-tim-blixseth-jailed-over-
missing-funds/#75fca9e476ae. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Drake, supra note 193. 
 200 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
 201 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896. 
 202 $92,000,000 is the aggregation of $100,000 of annual rent for ninety-two years.  
 203 $92,000 is the aggregation of $1,000 of annual rent for ninety-two years.  
 204 Id. 
 205 Harding, supra note 142. 
 206 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. Dolan could have also been looking to reopen 
the restaurant to profit on the subsequent developers’ investments in the resort. Given that Dolan closed Pinnacle 
years before the Spanish Peaks Resort filed for bankruptcy, id. at 896 , this possibility seems less likely than the 
possibility that Dolan was just seeking a buyout.  
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lease, Dolan had a right to encumber valuable space on the resort for more than 
ninety years at nominal rent of $1,000.207 Any subsequent owner of the land 
would thus have a strong incentive to buy out the lessees rather than allow 
continued possession at monthly rent of approximately $1,000. 
The location of Pinnacle within the Spanish Peaks Resort and the nature of 
Montana Opticom’s business is further evidence that Dolan was just seeking a 
buyout. As pre-bankruptcy maps of the resort show, Pinnacle sat atop Andesite 
Mountain at a point of convergence of multiple ski lift lines and the point of 
origin of multiple ski runs.208 Pinnacle was the only business operating on the 
Andesite Mountain summit.209 From this central location of the resort, Dolan 
could have used the restaurant entity’s leasehold interest to try to sabotage the 
resort’s purchaser. For instance, Dolan could have allowed the restaurant 
building to fall into a state of disrepair, thereby deterring skiers from visiting 
Andesite Mountain at all.210 Relatedly, Dolan could have used the Montana 
Opticom lease to cut off all telecommunications to the remote resort, making it 
an undesirable destination for vacationers. Absent any possible (and unlikely) 
provisions in the lease imposing duties on the tenants, and ignoring any potential 
common law claims, the subsequent owners of the resort would have likely had 
no recourse against the tenant entities.211 Worse, the more damage Dolan could 
have inflicted upon the purchaser, the more he would have been able to demand 
in a buyout. Dolan could have therefore used the restaurant entity’s leasehold 
 
 207 Id. at 894. See Spanish Peaks Resort, SKIMAP.ORG (Feb. 3, 2012), https://skimap.org/skiAreas/view/ 
1026, for the precise location of Pinnacle Restaurant on the Spanish Peaks Resort. The 2007 map indicates that 
the Pinnacle Restaurant was on Andesite Mountain. The 2010 map shows the ski runs on Andesite Mountain, as 
well as the restaurant.  
 208 See About Spanish Peaks, SPANISH PEAKS MOUNTAIN CLUB (2015), http://spanishpeaks. 
findyourbigsky.com/about-spanish-peaks/; Spanish Peaks Resort, SKIMAP.ORG (Feb. 3, 2012), https://skimap. 
org/skiAreas/view/1026. 
 209 Id. 
 210 One could easily imagine more colorful (and more effective) ways in which Dolan could have deterred 
vacationers from visiting Andesite Mountain. 
 211 Eviction would be a check on what Dolan could do, but unless Dolan actually triggered a ground for 
eviction under Montana law, this remedy would be unavailable to the landlord. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-422. 
The grounds for eviction in Montana include: (1) noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement; (2) 
failure to pay rent; (3) destruction, defacement, damage, impairment, or removal of any part of the premises by 
the tenant; and (4) creation of a reasonable potential by the tenant that the premises may be damaged or destroyed 
or that neighboring tenants may be injured. Id. Given the nominal rent of the leases at issue in Spanish Peaks, In 
re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894, failure to pay rent would almost certainly not be grounds 
for eviction. Likewise, given that Dolan controlled the parties on both sides of the leases, there were probably 
no robust obligations on the tenant entities. Ground (1) would be unlikely to be triggered. Grounds (3) and (4) 
would be possible if Dolan tried use the tenant leases to cause problems in an effort to negotiate a larger buyout. 
However, with good legal counsel, a tenant could easily avoid triggering § 70-24-422. Accordingly, eviction 
rights are unlikely to fully protect landlords.  
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interest to hold the entire mountain hostage, causing problems until the 
subsequent owner agreed to buy his entities out of the leases. From the 
purchaser’s perspective, it would be far better to just have a court fashion 
adequate protection in the form of compensation than to grant the tenant 
continued possession and leave it to the lease parties to reach an agreement 
outside of the bankruptcy proceedings.212 Accordingly, purchasers would likely 
bid more for land at auction in a jurisdiction that applied the minority 
approach.213 Higher bids honor the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of maximizing 
creditor recovery.214 At the same time, adequate protection ensures that tenants’ 
property interests are protected.215 Hence, the minority view balances the 
competing purposes of the Code better than the majority view.216  
Had the court granted continued possession, the need to make such a buyout 
would have presumably reduced the amount the mortgagee could have recovered 
from the bankruptcy sale.217 Creating a need to make a buyout would have failed 
to honor the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose of maximizing creditor recovery.218 
Indeed, there are three ways a tenant could receive a buyout following a 
bankruptcy auction, all of which detract from creditor recovery. First, the 
mortgagee, CH SP, could itself buy out the lessees, which would be functionally 
equivalent to CH SP having to pay an increased price for the property at the 
bankruptcy sale. Second, CH SP could sell the property before dealing with the 
remaining tenants. Here, however, the encumbrance would reduce the amount a 
buyer would be willing to pay. Finally, a party other than the mortgagee could 
purchase the property at auction at a reduced price due to the need to buyout the 
 
 212 Adequate protection could likely take the form of continued possession. See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. 
& Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (internal citations omitted); Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. 696. 
Under the minority view, if the bankruptcy judge determines that the tenant entity is only requesting continued 
possession to seek a large buyout, the judge can fashion adequate protection in the form of compensation. See 
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (internal citations omitted) (stating 
that adequate protection should take the form of compensation if not continued possession). 
 213 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (“To some extent, . . . estate property 
presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease.”). 
 214 Id. at 900–01 (calling it a “core purpose of the Code” to “maximiz[e] creditor recovery”). 
 215 Id. at 900. 
 216 See id. at 894, 901 (calling the protection of tenants and the maximization of creditor recovery the “core 
purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 217 See id. at 900–01 (noting that “[t]o some extent, protecting lessees reduces the value of the estate—
property presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease—and is therefore contrary to the goal of 
maximizing creditor recovery, another core purpose of the Code” (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 218 See id. (noting that “[t]o some extent, protecting lessees reduces the value of the estate—property 
presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease—and is therefore contrary to the goal of maximizing 
creditor recovery, another core purpose of the Code” (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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unwanted tenants. Letting the same individual whose ski resort filed for 
bankruptcy recover a large sum of money from the two leases following the 
auction would have been a tremendous abuse of the bankruptcy system. By 
adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach of requiring tenants to request adequate 
protection, the Ninth Circuit found an easy way to simultaneously maximize 
creditor recovery and foil Dolan’s scheme to use his tenant entities’ one-sided 
leases to negotiate an unfair buyout.219 
The Ninth Circuit likewise avoided granting the tenants a right to recover 
proceeds from the auction at the expense of SPH’s legitimate creditors, which 
also would have been unjust.220 Indeed, both companies’ leases arose after SPH 
obtained the $130,000,000 loan, and the same individual who founded and 
controlled the bankrupt ski resort also controlled each of the tenants.221 Letting 
Dolan wedge the claims of Pinnacle and Montana Opticom in front of the 
secured claim of the senior mortgagee is thus not an especially attractive 
solution.222 The Ninth Circuit in Spanish Peaks had a fairly easy escape valve: 
by taking the Seventh Circuit’s established approach to §§ 363 and 365, the 
appellate judges managed to evade having to fashion adequate protection at 
all.223 While that solution worked in Spanish Peaks, it will probably not work in 
future cases since tenants will likely begin requesting adequate protection in 
almost all landlord bankruptcies.224 Thus, in cases where undeserving tenants 
with bad intentions diligently request adequate protection, judges will be trapped 
between the Scylla of continued possession and the Charybdis of 
compensation.225 
 
 219 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
 220 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 221 Id. at 896. 
 222 See Harding, supra note 142. 
 223 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898. 
 224 See Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is 
to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section 
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding, 
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and 
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”). 
 225 Scylla and Charybdis were, “in Greek mythology, two immortal and irresistible monsters who beset 
the narrow waters traversed by the hero Odysseus in his wanderings described in Homer’s Odyssey, Book XII . 
. . . To be ‘between Scylla and Charybdis’ means to be caught between two equally unpleasant alternatives.” 
Scylla and Charybdis, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Scylla-and-Charybdis (last visited Nov. 
17, 2018). 
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B. Limiting Adequate Protection for Undeserving Tenants 
Had the tenants in Spanish Peaks diligently requested adequate protection 
prior to the bankruptcy auction, the bankruptcy judge would have faced the task 
of fashioning a remedy for two commercial tenants that deserved nothing. This 
situation will arise in cases where someone is trying to exploit the bankruptcy 
system, such as in Spanish Peaks where James Dolan controlled the parties on 
both sides of an extremely one-sided lease.226 The easy solution would be for the 
judge to simply terminate the lease, thereby raising more money for the debtor’s 
legitimate creditors and allowing the purchaser to take the land free and clear of 
the encumbrance. However, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution prohibits such a solution.227 Likewise, courts are 
unlikely to grant a security interest in property that is already totally 
encumbered, since this solution would leave the tenant with little or nothing in 
exchange for its property interest.228 Judges will accordingly have to use a bit 
more creativity to minimize adequate protection for commercial tenants that 
deserve nothing.  
The solution to granting undeserving tenants adequate protection really just 
involves adjusting the value placed on the leasehold interest. For instance, to 
minimize Pinnacle’s ability to recover from the bankruptcy sale of the ski resort 
in Spanish Peaks, the judge could give credence to an expert who values the 
leasehold interest as that of a long out-of-business restaurant located on a failed 
ski resort on a steep, remote mountaintop.229 Likewise, the expert could regard 
Montana Opticom as a company providing telecommunications services to a 
boarded-up ski resort.230 Perhaps the expert could even factor in the nominal rent 
that the two entities paid to the landlord entity.231 An expert who looked at the 
businesses in this light would surely estimate that the leases were worth far less 
than would an expert who considered the earning potential of Pinnacle and 
Montana Opticom should the ski resort reopen. It would only be incumbent on 
the ski resort’s purchaser to find an expert who would produce such numbers. 
 
 226 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
 227 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH 
FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 124 (4th ed. 2015). Under Montana law, a term of years 
is an interest in real property. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-15-202; Ditto v. Kipp, 300 Mont. 278, 282 (2000) (“A 
leasehold interest in land is an estate for years which is classified as an interest in real property.”).  
 228 See In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5, 9-10 (rejecting the debtor’s argument that the court could just 
give the tenant a security interest in the totally encumbered hospital in exchange for the lost leasehold interest 
on the ground that the tenant would likely recover nothing from such a lien).  
 229 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77921, at *12. 
 230 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 231 Id. at 894–95. 
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Given that the Bankruptcy Code’s standard for placing a value on real property, 
found in 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1), is extremely malleable,232 finding such an expert 
should not be exceedingly difficult. After placing a low value on the leases, the 
judge could grant the tenants adequate protection in the form of a lien on 
property of the debtor233 (assuming the debtor has property that is not totally 
encumbered).234 Although the tenants would recover some proceeds, in this way 
the judge could minimize the impact of tenant recovery on the debtor’s other, 
lower-priority creditors, all while avoiding violation of the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.235  
The appellate process presents one obstacle to this solution, although 
observant judges will be able to overcome this hurdle. The standard of review 
on appeal of valuation is de novo,236 meaning the bankruptcy judge’s valuation 
of the leasehold interests will get no deference. Hence, for the bankruptcy 
judge’s strategy to hold, any appellate judges would have to recognize the 
bankruptcy judge’s true reason for placing a low value on the lost leasehold 
interests. A surprisingly low valuation might in itself work to ensure this result 
by inspiring subsequent judges to investigate why the bankruptcy judge 
produced such a low value.237 Should the bankruptcy judge’s determination 
 
 232 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 227, at 75-78. Section 506(a)(1) provides that the value of a 
claim secured by real property “shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed 
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan 
affecting such creditor’s interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2016).  
 233 In the case of a ski resort such as the Spanish Peaks resort, this property might include snowmobiles, 
trucks, rental ski equipment, and furniture from the hotel. Such assets would likely have enough value to 
accommodate both a small debt to the tenants and part of the claims of the other creditors. A clever judge would 
assess the value of all the debtor’s unencumbered property prior to placing a value on the tenant’s leases to 
ensure that the other creditors would still recover something on their unsecured claims.  
 234 Additional difficulties will arise if all of the debtor’s property is totally encumbered by security 
interests. For example, suppose the resort entity’s only assets were the land and the snowmobiles, and that both 
the land and the snowmobiles were totally encumbered. In this case, the judge would have no way to provide 
compensation to the tenant without displacing the senior liens of the mortgage holder and the creditor(s) with 
security interests in the snowmobiles. See Baxter, supra note 70, at 490. Short of finding some way to invalidate 
the leases, a judge might have to grant continued possession in such a situation.  
 235 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 227, at 124. The judge 
could also use his/her discretion to vary adequate protection with this method. Indeed, should the judge think 
that a particular tenant deserves continued possession for less than the full duration of the lease, the judge could 
reduce the term of years and provide the tenant with compensation for the time lost. Such a solution would avoid 
hardships resulting from immediate dispossession, raise creditor recovery, and allow the purchaser to use the 
land for a different purpose sooner.  
 236 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033(d) (2018). 
 237 Although having faith in appellate judges to pick up on a bankruptcy judge’s unstated reasoning is not 
a perfect solution, it at least seems to have worked in Spanish Peaks. In that case, both the bankruptcy judge and 
the Ninth Circuit judges seem to have recognized that Dolan was trying to exploit the bankruptcy system with 
his tenant entities and their one-sided leases. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish 
Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913. See also Harding, supra note 142. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy 
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stand, the tenants would then only collect on the liquidation of the property 
securing their small claim (assuming there was enough value in the debtor’s 
other property for them to fully recover, and assuming they did not also hold 
some other claim). 
This solution of placing a low value on the leasehold estate and securing that 
debt with a lien on property of the debtor would benefit the debtor’s other 
creditors and the purchaser of the liquidated property. The purchaser would take 
the land unencumbered, which would avoid the problem of the tenants sitting on 
their long leasehold interests and nominal rent in an effort to receive a large 
buyout. Additionally, the fact that the land would no longer come with a bad 
bargain would presumably raise the purchase price at auction, benefitting the 
other creditors.238 By contrast, in a jurisdiction that follows the majority 
approach, a judge would have to grant continued possession,239 which would 
lower the purchase price at auction and thereby generate less money for the 
creditors.240 Thus, the minority approach of fashioning adequate protection for 
tenants can produce much better outcomes for creditors and purchasers than the 
majority approach of always granting continued possession.  
The solution proposed in this Comment, of valuing leasehold interests based 
on the tenants’ worthiness of adequate protection, would also close the loophole 
in the majority approach.241 Specifically, by giving undeserving tenants the 
smallest justifiable recovery for their prematurely terminated leasehold interests, 
a judge could deter individuals from arranging real estate developments in the 
same way Dolan did.242 Although this Comment’s solution may still allow 
tenants to recover some money from the bankruptcy liquidation of the landlord 
entity’s assets, the tenants would recover much less than they might if they 
received continued possession. Consequently, in minority-approach 
jurisdictions that adopt this Comment’s suggestions, the loophole that Dolan was 
attempting to exploit will become much less lucrative. Indeed, founding a 
number of separate entities, and preparing leases for each tenant entity to enter 
into with the landlord entity, would involve too much time, effort, and legal fees. 
Hence, the minority approach, coupled with the solution proposed in this 
 
Court and the Federal Court of Appeals authorized a sale of the ski resort free and clear of the tenants’ leasehold 
interests. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 
Bankr. LEXIS 913. 
 238 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900-01. 
 239 See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 
898 (describing the majority approach).  
 240 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898. 
 241 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 242 Id. See also Harding, supra note 142. 
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Comment, has the potential to close the loophole in the bankruptcy process that 
the individuals in Spanish Peaks were trying to exploit.243  
C. SNDA Clauses: A Weakness to the Minority Approach and the Proposed 
Solution 
In addition to a request for adequate protection, judges might face the 
obstacle of Subordination, Non-disturbance, and Attornment agreements 
(commonly referred to as “SNDA agreement”).244 In entering into a leasehold 
interest, tenants can protect themselves upfront by obtaining an SNDA 
agreement, which they would ideally negotiate concurrently with the lease.245 
An SNDA is a contract between a tenant and the mortgage lender of the tenant’s 
landlord that specifies in advance what will happen with the tenant’s leasehold 
interest in the event of a foreclosure.246 Parties to leases draft SNDA clauses to 
protect tenants’ interests should the landlord liquidate its encumbered property 
at bankruptcy auction.247 According to Andrew Royce:  
The typical SNDA states that the lease is subordinate (or junior) to the 
mortgage, but that if the mortgage is foreclosed, the new owner will 
not disturb the tenant’s possession under its lease so long as the tenant 
is not in default of the lease’s provisions, and the tenant will attorn to 
and recognize the new owner as its landlord. Thus[,] the lease will 
remain in effect, with the new owner becoming the landlord.248 
Importantly, the typical SNDA clause addresses the event of “foreclosure,” not 
bankruptcy.249 If Dolan had used such clauses in Spanish Peaks, they might have 
created an insurmountable obstacle for the judges to overcome in dispossessing 
the undeserving tenants. This concern might be much ado about nothing, though, 
given that tenants would presumably have to bargain for SNDA agreements with 
the landlord’s mortgage holder,250 which would in itself deter exploitation of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
 
 243 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC 872 F.3d 892. 
 244 See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold 
interest to survive liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Andrew Royce, SNDA Agreements Benefit Both 
Tenants and Lenders, LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2017)(url omitted). 
 245 Practical Legal Update supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold interest 
to survive liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Andrew Royce, supra note 244. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. (emphasis added) (Andrew Royce is a partner in Sherin and Lodgen’s real estate department). 
 249 See id. 
 250 Id. 
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Had Pinnacle Restaurant and Montana Opticom entered into a garden-
variety SNDA agreement with the mortgage lender of the Spanish Peaks Resort, 
a judge likely could have found the clause inapplicable.251 Indeed, SNDA 
clauses generally specify a tenant’s rights in the event of foreclosure.252 Ordinary 
SNDA clauses therefore do not speak to a tenant’s rights in the event of 
bankruptcy liquidation.253 Given that a foreclosure and a bankruptcy liquidation 
are distinguishable events, a judge could simply look to the plain language of 
the SNDA clause and thereby refuse to apply it to the purchase of land at 
bankruptcy auction. A finding that the SNDA clause does not apply to landlord 
bankruptcies would leave the tenant with only the remedy provided for under 
the holding of the Ninth Circuit; namely, that the tenant will have to request 
adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction to receive any compensation 
or continued possession.254 
The real problem with SNDA agreements will arise when tenants begin 
stipulating in advance with the landlord’s mortgagee what will happen in the 
event of a bankruptcy liquidation of the encumbered property.255 Had the 
restaurant and telecommunications company in Spanish Peaks entered into such 
an agreement with Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC, the mortgagee of 
the landlord-resort at the time of creation of the leases,256 the bankruptcy judge 
would have had tremendous difficulty depriving them of continued possession. 
Indeed, after Pinnacle and Montana Opticom entered into lease agreements with 
the Spanish Peaks Ski Resort, and after the resort’s bankruptcy filing, SPAP 
assigned its interest to CH SP Acquisitions, LLC, which was the mortgagee at 
the time of the bankruptcy auction.257 CH SP then purchased the land at 
auction.258 Therefore, had there been an SNDA contract that applied in the event 
of bankruptcy liquidation, it arguably would have been binding on CH SP as the 
ultimate assignee of all rights of SPAP.259 CH SP also would have lost the policy 
argument that the Bankruptcy Code seeks to maximize creditor recovery,260 
since it had essentially agreed to the clause (and thus consented to the risk of a 
 
 251 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 252 Royce, supra note 244. 
 253 Id. 
 254 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 255 See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158. 
 256 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894. The original mortgagee was Citigroup Global 
Markets Realty Corp., which assigned the note and mortgage to Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC, prior 
to the creation of the leases. Id. 
 257 Id. at 894-95. 
 258 Id. at 895. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 900-01. 
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reduced price at auction).261 Hence, a judge would probably have to apply the 
SNDA, since the clause would specifically speak to landlord bankruptcies and 
bind the landlord-debtor’s mortgage holder.  
Although the application of an SNDA agreement to allow tenants to remain 
in possession after bankruptcy liquidation of the encumbered land might at first 
seem unjust in facts like those of Spanish Peaks,262 a closer look shows that 
application of such clauses might not be so troublesome. In exchange for a right 
to remain in possession in the event of a landlord bankruptcy, the tenants would 
have to give the landlord’s mortgagee additional consideration. Depending on 
how much the tenants would have to pay for an SNDA clause that applies to 
bankruptcies, the need to give consideration would in itself discourage 
individuals from seeking to exploit the loophole in the bankruptcy system via 
contractual agreements. Further, a subsequent mortgage holder such as CH SP 
would presumably acquire the mortgage at a reduced value due to the broader 
SNDA clause. At the very least, CH SP would be on notice that the restaurant 
and telecommunications company had a contractual right to continued 
possession in the event of a landlord bankruptcy. In this light, SNDA agreements 
that protect tenants from the risk of dispossession in landlord bankruptcies no 
longer seem so problematic.  
In fact, SNDA clauses offer tenant entities one way to protect themselves 
from harsh results under the minority approach.263 Use of SNDA agreements 
would dispel many of the complaints critics had about the negative real-world 
effects of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Qualitech.264 Indeed, had the tenant 
entity there negotiated an SNDA clause with the landlord’s mortgage lender 
upon entering into the lease, the landlord would not have been able to liquidate 
the encumbered property free and clear of the tenant’s interest.265 Further, 
tenants with SNDA-agreement protections would presumably not hesitate to 
make improvements to leased property for fear of dispossession upon landlord 
bankruptcy.266 Most importantly, if tenants negotiate SNDA clauses, judges will 
not have to worry about the minority approach yielding less tenant protection—
 
 261 Id. at 894-95. 
 262 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 263 See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158. 
 264 See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1; Ferretti, supra note 70, at 723–28; Baxter, supra note 70; 
Zinman, supra note 17, at 106-18; White & Medford, supra note 70, at 28; Genovese, supra note 70. 
 265 See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158; Royce, supra note 244. 
 266 See Zinman, supra note 17, at 99–100, for a discussion of the potential of the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
to disrupt leasehold investment.  
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the main criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s holding.267 At the same time, judges 
could probably prevent SNDA clauses from enabling real estate developers such 
as Dolan to exploit the bankruptcy system. Indeed, should a judge ever think it 
necessary to invalidate an SNDA clause in a case involving a landlord 
bankruptcy, there might be a creative way to do so. Such a solution, however, 
can remain a topic for another paper. 
D. Protecting Small Business under the Minority Approach 
Businesses that do not seek assistance of legal counsel will be the most 
vulnerable to undesirable results under the minority approach due to the 
incentives for bankrupt landlords to not inform their tenants of the need to seek 
protection. These entities are less likely to negotiate an SNDA clause and less 
likely to request adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction; they will 
consequently lose any right to compensation or continued possession.268 
Represented lessors will avoid voluntarily informing lessees of the benefits of 
an SNDA agreement and of the need to request adequate protection prior to a 
bankruptcy sale. Indeed, if the lessor is seeking to reorganize under chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code, it will seek to maximize proceeds from liquidation of 
the land. Except in cases like Spanish Peaks, where the same person controlled 
the landlord entity and the tenant entities, the landlord will hope to strip off any 
leases, since any encumbrances will reduce the sale price of land at auction.269 
By choosing to not tell its tenants that they need to obtain an SNDA agreement 
or request adequate protection to avoid losing their leasehold interests, the 
landlord will have a greater chance of being able to sell the property free and 
clear of any leases. The landlord will then have more money to allocate to its 
creditors, which will increase its chances of getting an approved plan. Further, 
in cases where the landlord intends to reacquire the property following the 
bankruptcy sale, stripping off encumbrances will allow the landlord to both evict 
the tenant and keep any of the tenant’s improvements. Thus, as the law currently 
stands, leaving it to the landlord-debtor to give the tenant notice of the need to 
request adequate protection would be akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse. 
The lesson to be learned here is simple: to ensure that their rights will be 
 
 267 See In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1; Ferretti, supra note 70, at 723–28; Baxter, supra note 70; Zinman, 
supra note 17, at 106–18.  
 268 See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. See also Practical 
Legal Update, supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold interest to survive 
liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Royce, supra note 244. 
 269 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900. 
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protected should landlord bankruptcy occur, small businesses just need to seek 
counsel before entering into leasehold agreements.270  
CONCLUSION 
Spanish Peaks exposes a major loophole in the Bankruptcy Code in cases 
involving landlord bankruptcies;271 this Comment has shown how judges might 
close it to honor the Bankruptcy Code’s core policies of tenant protection and 
maximization of creditor recovery.272 To exploit the loophole, a real estate 
developer can create two entities and have them enter into a lease as landlord 
and tenant. In the event the landlord entity must file for bankruptcy relief and 
liquidate its encumbered land, the developer can sit on the tenant entity’s lease 
to either remain in possession or receive compensation.273 If the tenant entity 
gets to retain possession, the sale price of the land at auction will presumably be 
lowered;274 at the same time, the developer will get a financial windfall from 
either a buyout by the subsequent landlord or profits from the tenant entity’s 
business.275 If, instead of continued possession, the tenant entity receives 
compensation for its lost leasehold interest, that money will have to come out of 
the landlord-debtor’s estate, reducing the pool of funds available for the 
repayment of the debtor’s other creditors. Either possibility overprotects the 
tenants and detracts from creditor recovery, thereby failing to properly balance 
the Bankruptcy Code’s two competing goals.276  
 
 270 See Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is 
to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section 
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding, 
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and 
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”). Ideally, the small business’s 
counsel will not only negotiate an SNDA agreement with the landlord’s mortgage holder, Practical Legal Update, 
supra note 158, Royce, supra note 244, but will also alert the business of the need to immediately seek counsel 
again in the event of a landlord bankruptcy.  
 271 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899-900. 
 272 See id. at 900-01 (defining the maximization of creditor recovery and the protection of tenants as the 
“core purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 273 See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (stating that adequate 
protection will take the form of either continued possession or compensation); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1996) (granting continued possession to the tenant of a bankrupt landlord). See also In re Spanish Peaks 
Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach” and 
Qualitech as an example of the “‘Minority’ approach”). 
 274 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900. 
 275 See Harding, supra note 142. 
 276 See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892 (defining the maximization of creditor 
recovery and the protection of tenants as the “core purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code).  
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Now that the Ninth Circuit has analyzed the facts of Spanish Peaks,277 other 
real estate developers who were previously unaware of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
loophole might start using the above business model as a blueprint for their own 
developments.278 This will be especially true of developers in majority 
jurisdictions, since tenant entities always receive continued possession in 
landlord bankruptcies under the majority approach.279 Even in minority 
jurisdictions, though, developers will request adequate protection in an effort to 
manipulate judges into having to grant the tenant entities continued possession 
or compensation.280 Most developers will probably arrange their businesses with 
a landlord entity and various tenant entities as a safety net in case the landlord 
entity fails and has to file for bankruptcy relief.281 Furthermore, bad actors could 
file for bankruptcy relief from the start and use the tenant entities as a way to 
make additional money at the expense of the landlord’s legitimate creditors.282 
The majority approach of always granting continued possession offers courts 
little flexibility in protecting creditors against such schemes.283  
As this Comment has shown, however, the minority approach provides 
judges with a way to deter developers from attempting to exploit the loophole in 
the Bankruptcy Code. By placing a low value on a tenant entity’s leasehold 
 
 277 In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. 
LEXIS 913. 
 278 One could easily imagine other real estate developments that could be arranged like the Spanish Peaks 
Resort, with a landlord entity owning the resort property and a number of smaller tenant entities providing the 
amenities. For instance, a developer might set up a golf resort to have a landlord entity that owns the golf course 
and the surrounding property and various tenant entities that run businesses such as a hotel, a pro shop, and a 
nineteenth-hole bar.  
 279 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, 
LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”). 
 280 See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (“‘Adequate 
protection’ does not necessarily guarantee a lessee’s continued possession of the property, but it does demand, 
in the alternative, that the lessee be compensated for the value of its leasehold—typically from the proceeds of 
the sale.”); Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is to 
aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section 
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding, 
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and 
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”).  
 281 This actually seemed to be the case in Spanish Peaks. Dolan ran a legitimate ski resort on the land at 
issue for approximately five years. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894; In re Spanish Peaks 
Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *4-13. Only after the resort filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and sold 
its property at auction did Dolan try to recover losses with the restaurant lease and the telecom lease. See In re 
Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. 
 282 See generally Anderson, supra note 193; Drake, supra note 199; Drake, supra note 194; Fisher, supra 
note 197.  
 283 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 142. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 
898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”). 
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interest, the judge can minimize the amount of compensation the tenant receives 
in the bankruptcy distribution process. No longer will it be worth the time, effort, 
and expense for developers to set up a business so as to recoup losses in the 
event of bankruptcy. At the same time, in cases where the tenants of bankrupt 
landlords really do deserve protection, this Comment’s suggestions still allow 
judges to grant continued possession or to place a fair value on the tenant’s 
leasehold interest. In other words, the solution proposed in this Comment 
enables a judge to use his/her discretion on a case-by-case basis to strike the 
right balance between the Bankruptcy Code’s competing policies of protecting 
tenants and maximizing creditor recovery.284 Only in a minority jurisdiction will 
a judge be able to make this determination.285 The Ninth Circuit got it right. 
Other courts should follow its lead.  
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 284 See id. at 900-01 (defining protecting tenants and maximizing creditor recovery as the competing “core 
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